II. Confrontations

1. Love and Logic of Identity in Peirce and Welby

The theory of personal identity as conceived by Peirce is developed across at least three fundamental stages: 1) in his writings from the years 1867-1868 published in *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, and characterized by its semiotic interpretation of human consciousness: "whenever we think, we have present to the consciousness some feeling, image, conception, or other representation which serves as a sign" (*CP* 5.314); 2), five articles published in the journal *The Monist* as beginning from 1891. Peirce here introduces his doctrines of tychism, synechism and agapism, his evolutionary cosmology while continuing his work in this context on his theory of the human person; and 3) his more recent writings on pragmaticism which unite the developments of his cosmology and his theory of semiotics.

Peirce opposes the concepts of "personality", "personal self", "individual self" which theorize a finite self to the concept of self in communion with other selves. The finite self or "personal self" is an "illusory phenomenon", but to the extent that human beings are egotistical they believe they can live and flourish separately from others, from the human community they in fact belong to. And to the extent that they believe this, they are creating the conditions for such illusory forms of isolation. In reality, self can never be wholly divided or separated from the other. As Peirce teaches, human existence completely isolated from the other is not possible nor is isolatedness a guarantee of the uniquess or singularity of a single individual person, of self's specificity, of its otherness with respect to the otherness of others. To be a self involves being a possible member of a community, so that what counts and should be theorized is not "my" experience but "ours" (cf. *CP* 5.402 n.2). In any case, of great interest is how Peirce associates the social and communitary character of the self with such values as the self's uniquess, singularity, signifying otherness. The capacity for signifying on one's own accout beyond and apart from references to anything else is theorized with recourse to the category of firstness. This implies that self's uniquess, its irreducibility to a referent, is unveiled and developed in the relationship with the other.

A fundamental role is attributed to the body in the development of consciousness to the point that in a Peircean semiotic perspective consciousness is incarnated consciousness. The body is a condition for the full development of consciousness and, therefore, of the human person as a sign or symbol. Peirce establishes a relationship between the man-symbol and the word-symbol to the end of avoiding oversimplification from a symbolic viewpoint–self is not a thing (*CP* 7.591)–while at the same time underlining the materiality or corporeity of signs.

Such an approach to subjectivity not only concerns the intellectual sphere but also the ethic and the affective. And in his discussion in semiotic terms not only of the functioning and development of cognition and will but also of emotion, desire, feeling, Peirce states that "there is no reason for supposing a power of introspection; and consequently, the only way of investigating a psychological question is by inference from external facts" (*CP* 5.249). As she states in her unpublished manuscripts (available in the Archives at York University Library, Special Collections, Ontario, Canada) dedicated to the probem of *Subjectivity*, Victoria Welby, too, is strongly critical of the concept of introspection and its implications for the construction of human identity as theorized and practiced in her time (cf., for example, *I and Self,* Nov. 23rd. 1907, Box *Subjectivity*). In Peirce's view a fundamental aspect of the interpersonal relationship is one's sympathy for the other, one's sentiment for the other, the condition of feeling for one another, of being in communion with the other while at the same time maintaining one's own specificity or singularity as a unique

individual. According to Peirce, sentimentalism is the "doctrine that great respect should be paid to the natural judgements of the sensible heart" (*CP* 6.292), and is strictly related to Peirce's interrelational and intersubjective approach to self and knowledge. And particularly interesting is the importance he places on such values for the successful development of scientific research, whose consequences are drawn out with his "agapistic theory of evolution" (*CP* 6.295).

In a paper entitled "Evolutionary Love", 1893 (the last of a series of five published in the journal *The Monist*, and now included in the volume *Chance, Love and Logic*, 1923) Peirce distinguishes between three distinct but strictly interrelated modes of development regulating evolution in the cosmos: tychastic evolution or "tychasm", a term used to indicate development regulated by the action of *chance*, "evolution by fortuitous variation", says Peirce; anancastic evolution or "anancasm" which is dominated by the effect of *necessity*, in the words of Peirce "evolution by mechanical necessity"; and agapastic evolution or "agapasm" which is orientated by the law of *love*, that is "evolution by creative love". The name of the doctrines that elect these three evolutionary modes as their object of analysis are respectively "tychasticism", "anancasticism" and "agapasticism"; while at a lower level of discourse the terms "tychism", "anancism" and "agapism" name "the mere propositions that absolute chance, mechanical necessity, and the law of love are severally operative in the cosmos" (*CP* 6.302). Evoking the language of geometry, Peirce describes tychasm and anancasm as "degenerate forms of agapasm", in other words the latter englobes the former two as its degenerate cases (cf. *CP*, 6.303).

Tychasm shares a disposition for reproductive creation with agapasm, "the forms preserved being those that use the spontaneity conferred on them in such wise as to be drawn into harmony with their original". This as Peirce continues "only shows that just as love cannot have a contrary, but must embrace what is most opposed to it, as a degenerate case of it, so tychasm is a kind of agapasm". Differently from tychastic evolution, which procedes by exclusion, in genuine agapasm advance takes place by virtue of a "positive sympathy", says Peirce, that is, by virtue of attraction or affinity among the "created", let us read "interpretants", "springing from continuity of mind" (or synechism) (cf. *CP* 6. 304), in other words, from open-ended interpretive processes constituting the semiotic material of the universe. The concept of continuity involves that of regularity. As emerges from her own philosophy of the signifying processes permeating the entire universe, Welby too believes that development is beaten out and articulated in a structure and, furthermore, that continuity presupposes relational logic grounded in otherness, a sort of dia-logic. The overall orientation of anancasm is regulated by "an intrinsic affinity for the good", says Peirce, and from this viewpoint it is similar to the agapastic type of advance. But as close to agapasm as it may come, anancasm lacks in a determinant factor for evolution, that is, the factor of "freedom" that instead characterizes creative love and subtends tychism (cf. *CP* 6.305).

Understood as development by virtue of the forces of affinity and sympathy and referring to one of Peirce's most important tripartitions of the sign, we could say that agapasm is strongly *iconic* (the other two terms correlated with the icon are notoriously the *index* and the *symbol*). Agapastic evolution alludes to evolution regulated by the law of love, creative and altruistic love, as Welby would say, love oriented toward others; though foreseeing the action of chance and necessity as well, in agapastic evolution the forces of attraction, affinity and freedom prevail and, therefore, iconicity in the relationship among interpretants in the continuous (synechetic) flow of unlimited semiosis.

On her part, Welby too identifies three principal modes in the development of the universe: the "planetary", the "solar" and the "cosmic" which indicate three levels of increasing complexity and signifying power according to the model proposed by her meaning triad with its tripartition into "sense", "meaning" and "significance" (cf. Welby 1893, 1896, 1983). The universe develops and is

amplified through the generation/interpretation of signs in a continuously expanding network as signs and senses multiply. In such a context evolutionary development is not only achieved by describing objective facts, the effectual, that is, what effectively happens in the external world, among the created, but beyond this by hypothesizing future developments, possible or simply imaginative worlds, by accepting the challenge of the "play of musement" (a concept taken from Peirce and developed particularly by Thomas A. Sebeok) as the various planes of existence, sign activity and discourse interweave.

In another series of unpublished manuscripts written at the beginning of the twentieth century, Welby elaborates her original concept of *mother-sense,* subsequently replaced by the term *primal sense* and its variant *primary sense* (Box 28, *Subject File* 24). This concept plays a central role in the processes of signification and interpretation as she conceives them and, therefore, in the construction of worldviews. Welby distinguishes between "sense" and therefore "mother-sense", on one hand, and "intellect" and therefore "father-reason", on the other. And with this distinction it is her intention to indicate the general difference between two main modes–that in fact cut across sexual differences–in the generation/interpretation of sense, hypothetically isolatable at the level of theory but strictly interrelated in praxis or sense producing practices ("sense" being here understood in a broad sense as inclusive of "meaning" and "significance").

Mother-sense is the generating source of sense and of the capacity for criticism, says Welby; it is subtended by the logic of otherness and as such corresponds to the capacity for knowing in a broad and creative sense through sentiment, perception, intuition, and cognitive leaps; thinking of Peirce, we could say that it is the idea intuited before it is possessed or before it possesses us. As the capacity for knowledge, which we may also intend in the Peircean sense of *agapic or sympathetic comprehension and recognition,* or in the Bakhtinian sense of *answering comprehension*, mother-sense belongs to the human race in its totality, "an inheritance common to humanity", says Welby, without being limited to a particular sexual gender, the female, even though on a socio-historical level the woman may emerge as its main guardian and disseminator given the course of events in the development of culture and society.

With the term "intellect" as understood by Welby we are on the side of inferential processes of the inductive and deductive type, that is, where the logic of identity dominates over alterity. With "mother-sense" we are on the side of signifying processes dominated by alterity and, with reference to Peirce's renown classification of signs into symbol, index and icon, by the iconic dimension; mother-sense, or "racial sense", as Welby also calls it, alludes to the creative and generative forces of sense resulting from the capacity to associate things which would seem distant from each other but which in reality are attracted to one another, and, therefore, from the capacity for analogy and homology; from the viewpoint of argumentation "mother-sense" rests on the side of logical procedures of the abductive type insofar as they are regulated by the values of otherness, creativity, dialogicality, freedom and desire. Furthermore, "mother-sense" includes "father-sense" (even if latently), while the contrary is not true. For this reason both mother-sense and intellect need to be recovered in their original condition–both on a philogenetic and ontogenetic level–of dialectic and dialogic interrelation.

Logic as intended by Welby is logic where the broader and generative dimension of sense, the original level, the primal level, mother-sense, racial sense, the "matrix" interweaves with rational, intellectual life in a relationship of dialectic interdependency and reciprocal enrichment. According to Welby, logic to classify as logic must always be associated with primal sense. And, indeed, one of the major goals of significs is to recover the relationship among signs of "answering comprehension", to say it with Bakhtin, or of "agapic or sympathetic comprehension", to say it with Peirce, and therefore of reciprocal empowering between primal sense and rational life. This

relationship is necessary for a full development of critical sense and, therefore, of the maximum value, meaning and purport of experience in its totality. Welby's concept of logic may also be associated with Peirce's when the latter describes the great principle of logic in terms of "self-surrender" while clarifying that this does not mean that self is to lay low for the sake of an ultimate triumph, and even though this may come about, it must not be the governing purpose of behavior (cf. *CP* 5.402, note 2).

In a letter to Peirce of January 21st. 1909, Welby significantly agrees with the former's observation that logic is the "ethics of the intellect", which supports our description of her position concerning what we may call the "ethics of criticism". Scientific rigor in reasoning, to be worthy of such a description must rise from agapastic logical procedures, from "primal sense", and, therefore, from the courage of admitting to the structural necessity–for the evolution of sign, subject and consciousness–of inexactitude, instability and crisis (cf. Welby/Peirce January 21st. 1909, in Hardwick 1977: 91)

In Welby's description and similarly to Peirce, the human being is a community of parts distinct from each other but not separate. Far from excluding each other these parts, or selves, are reciprocally dependent on each other, that is, they are founded on the logic of otherness and of unindifference among the differences which excludes the possibility of undifferentiated confusion among the parts, of leveling the other on self. As says Welby, to confound is to sacrifice distinction (*ibid.*). Therefore, to the extent that it represents an excess with respect to the sum of its parts, the I or "Ident", another neologism introduced by Welby in her unpublished manuscripts, is not the "individual" but the "unique" (cf. "I and self", June 1907). Here we may interpret what Welby understands by "unique"–which has nothing to do with the monadic separatism of Stirner's conception of the unique, of singularity–with the concept of "non relative otherness" as understood by Lévinas.

Love is directed to the concrete, and not to abstractions, to persons, one's neighbour not necessarily in a spatial sense, locally, but in the sense of affinity, a person "we live near [...] in life and feeling": love is a driving force where iconicity, abduction and creativity are clearly operative. Applying the lesson learnt from St. John, with Peirce we may infer that the mind and the cosmos develop through the power of love understood as orientation toward the other, as care for the other. And recalling his essay of 1892, "The Law of Mind", he reminds his readers that the type of evolution foreseen by synechism, the principle of continuity, is evolution through the agency of love whose prime characteristic, as we have already pointed out, is that it puts us into a position to recognize the germs of loveliness in the hateful and make it lovely (cf. *CP* 6.287-289).

Peirce polemically contrasts the "Gospel of Christ" according to which progress is achieved by virtue of a relationship of sympathy established among neighbours, with the "Gospel of greed" which he describes as the dominant tendency of the times consisting in the assertion of the individual and, therefore, of one's own individuality or egoistic identity over the other (cf. *CP* 6.294). Here we may draw a parallel between Peirce's critique of the supremacy of the individual and Welby's developed in terms of her analysis of the dynamics between I and self, and of her critique of the self's tendency to transform selfness into selfishness or selfism. Darwin's *Origin of Species* (1859), the idea of natural selection, the survival of the fittest, the struggle for existence are examples of the translation of this concept of the indivual from nineteenth century political economy to the sciences of life, from economic development to the development of the living organism. On his part, Peirce chooses the agapastic theory of evolution and in fact considers his own strong attraction for this doctrine as possible proof of its truth (cf. *CP*, 6.295).

Recalling Henry James, Peirce distinguishes between self-love, love directed to another insofar as s/he is exactly like self, and creative love directed to what is completely different, even "hostile and negative" with respect to self, love directed to the other insofar as s/he is other. On this basis we could develop a typology of love passing from a high degree of identity to a high degree of alterity. But truly creative love, as both Welby and Peirce teach us, is love regulated by the logic of otherness, love for the other, directed to the other insofar as s/he is other. We could claim that the logic of otherness is an agapastic logic and that otherness, dialogicality, love and abduction together constitute the generating nucleus of signs, sense and worlds that are real, possible, or only imaginary (cf. *CP* 6.287).

If we consider Peirce in the perspective proposed in this paper, and bearing in mind the titles of two volumes that collect his writings in Italian translation, *La semiotica cognitiva* and *Caso amore e logica*, we could maintain that to study Peirce today is to push beyond him considered in a cognitive perspective in the direction of what we propose to call *teleosemiotics*. This is the task we have presently set ourselves and in such a perspective certain aspects of Peirce's work, similarly to Welby's, can no longer be ignored.

2. Bakhtin and Welby in (Imaginary) Dialogue

Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-1975) and Victoria Welby (1837-1912) belong to different countries, Russia and England respectively, to different historical periods and to different socio-cultural and political backgrounds. However, despite such chronotopic diversity, and despite the fact that such diversity was never bridged by any form of direct or indirect contact, Bakhtin and Welby rnay be related on a theoretical level in what we may envisage as an imaginary dialogue.

The sign model traceable in the theories of Bakhtin and Welby is an open model based on the value of dialogic otherness and signifying excess. This implies that categories are required capable of accounting for the specific signifying quality of signs, particularly enhanced in verbal signs, including: "dialogism", "answering comprehension", "otherness" (both internal and external), and "excess."

Like Bakhtin, Welby's interest in problems of meaning initially began with her studies on religious, theological and exegetical issues and more specifically with problems arising from the textual interpretation of the Bible. These studies found early expression in a book of 1881, *Links and Clues*. At the time, Welby had already identified problems that were to become central in her later studies on meaning: these included her concept of the linguistic conscience, her criticism of plain, common-sense and obvious meaning, of so-called "linguistic traps", her attention for the essential ambiguity of signs in general and of verbal signs in particular, her concept of textual interpretation based on awareness against the temptation of reassuring monologism, of the semantic pliancy and polylogism of signs, and of the potential multiplicity of interpretive itineraries with respect to a single text.

Aware of the dialogic plurilingualism and changeability of the semantic value of verbal signs, Welby advocated the necessity of developing a more acute discriminating linguistic conscience in the formulation of truths and dogmas. In a section entitled "Words" in her 1881 book, Welby wrote that we "survey the same expanse of truth from as many 'points' as possible", attributing many of the problems arising in relation to exegetic interpretation, dogma and orthodoxy to the failure of doing just this, to the lack of awareness of the ambiguity of words and their equivocation.

Therefore, those aspects of signification which in her more mature work were to be covered by her theory of the "plasticity" of language, were already present in her writings of 1881.

For Bakhtin also, who was brought up in the Russian Orthodox tradition and remained a believer all his life (cf. Clark-Holquist 1984: 120-145), religious concerns were of central importance (especially in the early stages of his work). Bakhtin advocated the need to view religious issues in relation to the other spheres of human investigation, in relation to science and philosophy. Religion thus considered emerged as a system of ideas interacting dialogically with other systems of ideas in a continually changing world. Such an attitude contradicted methodogical monism, the unquestioning acceptance of dogma and received truths. Both Bakhtin and Welby reviewed religious issues in relation to language, in the perspective of the ethics of terminology, of critical awareness and interpretive discernment. Being conscious of the polylogic and polyphonic nature of reality, of the coexistence of different viewpoints, Bakhtin, similariy to Welby, conceived the flux of life as a polyphonic interrelation of differences in continual transformation.

Without being subservient to linguistics both Welby and Bakhtin maintain that linguistic material is common to all human cultural expressions. The specificity of human culture lies in its linguistic-idedogical value (Bakhtin) or linguistic-psychological value (Welby). Consequently, language analysis is not only necessary in dealing with problems of a strictly linguistic order, but with human experience at large given that in the last analysis it is rooted in language.

For both Bakhtin and Welby, the reality of signs and their meaning is the product of dynamic, dialectic, and dialogic interaction among speakers. Signs are not abstract and private entities relevant to the meaning intention of the individual, subjective consciousness, but, on the contrary, they are concrete expressions, at any given moment, of the experience of plural, social consciousness, of the social context with which the single individual continuously interacts. And analogously to a living organism, the sign is subject to change, renewal and enrichment through the acquisition of new voices, knowledge and experience. The word as it is received and elaborated by the speaking community is the sign of meanings which from a diachronic viewpoint have accumulated during the process of historical development, are co-present at the moment of use by the individual speaker, and as Welby avers, are subject to transformation at the very moment of utterance when, indeed, they acquire a fresh imprint, a new accentuation as Bakhtin would say. Thus when managing words, we are not dealing with entities that are anonymous, fixed once and for all and devoid of their own configuration, but rather with historical products endowed with the signifying intentions of others, with their own ideological consistency and capacity for further elaboration.

Welby and Bakhtin take their distances from the objective empiricism of positivistic thought. Bakhtin is critical of the mechanistic and predialectic type of materialism and, therefore, of the positivistic description of empirical data in terms of the non-dialectic, fixed, stable, precisely delimited and undisputable. This stance finds resonance in Welby's criticism of "hard dry facts". Indeed, for both Welby and Bakhtin facts and data are part of sign mediated reality: as the object of interpretation they emerge as signs endowed with meaning pregnant with the interpretive experience of others.

By contrast with nonverbal signs, verbal signs do not exist outside their sign function. The word is completely absorbed by its sign function and as such is the fullest expression of social relations: the word is uniquely ideological signifying reality. As expressions of social communication, cultural systems and the ideology that fashions them are best studied through analysis of the word, the ideological phenomenon par excellence. Verbal signs have the greatest potential for semantic and ideological plurality. According to Weby, "thought is not merely 'clothed' in language", but rather

thought and language belong to the common process of interpretation. Mental life is rooted in language, and therefore, as Bakhtin says, the science of psychology must be rooted in verbal-ideological theory, or to say it with Welby, in language theory. The reality of the human psyche is linguistic-cultural-ideological reality, therefore sign reality. Consequently for both Bakhtin and Welby, problems connected with human psychic life are best dealt with through a sign interpretation approach. In this perspective, the problem of the relation between the individual psyche and cultural ideological expressions at large is also that of specifying and distinguishing between the notions of "indivual" and "social", "inner' and "outer" within the common context of sign life.

The individual as a person and not merely as a biological entity is a social product. The content of the human individual psyche is social as is the language of which it is made. Bakhtin identified the specificity of the individual psyche in the union between the biological organism and the system of socio-economic and cultural conditions which enable that organism to subsist and develop as a human person. The individual organism and outer experience meet in the sign. The individual consciousness is fundamentally social consciousness. The relation between thought and external reality is a sign mediated relation for both the individual and the collectivity: "the inner psyche is not analyzable as a thing but can only be understood and interpreted as a sign" (cf. Voloshinov 1929, Eng. trans. 1973: 25-26).

Welby's position runs parallel to Bakhtin's notwithstanding inevitable differences in terminology. In a pamphlet entitled *The Use of the "Inner" and the "Outer" in Psychology: Does the Metaphor Help or Hinder?* (1892), Welby gave abundant evidence of the detrimental effect on ideas of the misuse of figurative language. She critically analyzes, for example, the pairs of opposites used in relation to mental life: "Inner and outer," "inside and outside," "interior and exterior," "within and without," "Self anc Not-self," and observes that such dichotomies have fostered the erroneous conviction of a clear-cut distinction between mental life and material life:

"Mind" and "matter", "thought" and "thing," embrace all that is, all reality, all that has meaning and therefore importance or consequence (*ibid*.: 4).

After all what do we rightly want to do in describing the mental or physical world as Inner and the material or physical world as Outer? Do we not want to emphasize distinction while preserving continuity or even identity; to give intension in the one case and extension in the other? Cannot these be equally secured by more abstract terms, like subjective and objective? (*ibid*.: 6)

Similarly to Bakhtin for Welby too the aim should be to construct an objective psychology, where "objective" may be read as "socio-semiotic" and, therefore, to define inner experience, the subjective consciousness, in terms of objective, outer experience. This does not mean to accept behaviorism in its mechanistic version, openly criticized by Bakhtin (Voloshinov 1929), but as understood by Morris (1964) who was influenced by George H. Mead.

Popular culture is a major issue for both Welby and Bakhtln. As emerges in his books on Dostoevsky and Rabelais, Bakhtin's theory of literature rests on philosophy of language that takes into account the expressive reserve of folklore tradition. Bakhtin theorizes carnival, the reversal of hierarchical relations, the elimination of social distances, profanation and joyful relativity, all of which are useful in highlighting the potential polyphony of linguistic life. Welby too focused on the creative expressiveness of popular culture and its effect on cultural regeneration and renewal at large. She often pointed to the unconsciously philosophical, popular instinct of the "man in the street", symbolized by the question "What does it mean?", or "what does it signify?", as a model for the treatment of language problems at the theoretical level. She stressed the particolar "significal" pregnancy of his idiom, particularly as it found expression in folklore tradition and narrative:

[...] both slang and popular talk, if intelligently regarded and appraised, are reservoirs from which valuable new currents might be drawn into the main stream of language–rather armouries from which its existing powers could be continuously re-equipped and re-enforced. (Welby 1985: 38-39)

The question "What does it mean?" or "What does it signify?", brings Welby to the question of the moral or ethic aspect of speech life and signifying processes in general, to the practical bearing and ethical value of signs. According to Welby, it is important that speakers develop a critical awareness of the value and "true significance of ambiguity", that they realize the value of experience through reflexion on the value of signs. Similarly to Bakhtin and coherently with interpretation semiotics and the sign model it proposes, sign value, according to Welby, must be looked for beyond the limits of intentional communication: it is neither founded on the logic of exchange value nor of use value, but on the logic of otherness and signifying excess, it is identified by Welby and Bakhtin respectively in "significance" and "theme". In the words of Bakhtin (-Volosinov):

Theme is a complex, dynamic system of signs that attempts to be adequate to a given instant of the generative process. Theme is reaction by the consciousness in its generative process to the generative process of existence. Meaning is the technical apparatus for the implementation of theme (Voloshinov 1929, Eng. trans. 1973:10).

The boundary between "theme" and "meaning" is not clear-cut and definitive for the two terms interact and cannot subsist independently of each other: the "meaning" of the utterance is conveyed by transforming it into an element of the "theme," and vice versa, the "theme is necessarily based on some kind of fixity of meaning if communicative interaction is to be realized at all. In Welby, "sense" beyond is sensorial signifying implications, concerns the way the word is understood according to the rules of conventional use, it concerns the word in relation to the circumstances of communicative interaction, to the universe of discourse and never in isolation (this is the dialectic described by Bakhtin between "meaning" and "theme"). Welby's "meaning" refers to the precise communicative intention of the user, her "significance" designates the import, implication, the overall and ideal value of the utterance.

There is, strictiy speaking, no such thing as the Sense of a word, but only the sense in which it is used–the circumstances, state of mind, reference, "universe of discourse" belonging to it. The Meaning of a word is the intent which it is desired to convey–the intention of the user. The Significance is always manifold, and intensifies its sense as well as its meaning, by expressing its importance, its appeal to us, its moment for us, its emotional force, its ideal value, its moral aspect, its universal or at least social range. (Welby 1983:5-6)

We may relate Bakhtin's "meaning" to Welby's "sense"; his "theme" to her "meaning" and "significance". Such correspondences can of course only be approximate, given that, among other things, the concepts in question represent different attempts at breaking down a unitary totality which in reality is indivisibie. Indeed, theoretical distinctions are always made by way of abstraction and serve to focus on particular aspects of signs. Let us remember, however, that not only do signs exist as whole entities, but that they act in relation to each other, finding in each other their specificity and significance in dialectic and dialogic signifying processes.

This parallel between Welby and Bakhtin is an attempt at appreciating their respective thought systems more fully, by translating Welby's discourse into Bakhtin's and viceversa, enabling them to shed light on each other. But more than this it is hoped that their relevance to semiotic discourse has sufficiently emerged for the reader to be aware of the eventual contribution that may come from these authors for a more comprehensive treatment of current problems in language and communication theory. In such a perspective, the cultural and chronotopic distance that impeded dialogue in real life ends up being an advantage for the realization of dialogue at the level of theoretical confrontation.

3. Morrisian behaviorism and Peircean pragmatism

Pragmatism and logical empiricism are the two main trends in American thought taken up by Charles Morris and united in a doctrine called scientific empiricism at the time of his adherence to the project of Unified Science as envisaged by the supporters of logical positivism. It was within this perspective that Morris' behaviorism was to be gradually delineated as his research proceeded. Applied to psychology, the physicist thesis underlying the Unity of Science Movement found expression in American behaviorism, which generally consisted in rejecting the notions of mind and consciousness (refusal of mentalism) and in limiting investigation to the observable behavior of organisms. On his part, Morris had already dealt with the problem of sign within the framework of his discussion of mentalism and behaviorism in his early 1927 article, "The concept of the symbol". Morris' association of the study of signs with behaviorism initially occurred with reference to the latter as it had been formulated by K. Koffka and by A. P. Weiss. In addition to this, Morris was even more strongly influenced by the behaviorism of his master, George H. Mead, who in 1922 had already published an article entitled "A behaviorist's account of the significant symbol".

For a study of Morris' relation to the American pragmatists and behaviorists during the years of his intellectual formation, of fundamental importance is his 1932 survey of the various trends in American philosophy, *Six Theories of Mind*. In this volume Morris examines diverse stances from Plato to Russell and Whitehead in the light of the epistemological relation between mind and world. Furthermore, this volume proposes a discussion of the pragmatism of Peirce, James, and Dewey with references also to Mead, whose influence on Morris was more direct. Working in the same direction, another significant volume is *Logical Positivism, Pragmatism and Scientific Empiricism* (Morris 1937), a collection of five articles originally published between 1934 and 1936. Here Morris examines logical positivism in its formulation by the Vienna Circle, together with other trends in European philosophy (of which he had had direct experience during his stay in Europe in 1935) in relation to the American tradition of thought.

In 1938, besides *Foundations of the Theory of Signs,* Morris also published "Scientific empiricism" as well as "Peirce, Mead, and pragmatism". In the latter he insisted on the affinity between Peirce and Mead, or more precisely between Peirce's "original pragmatism" (or "pragmaticism") and Mead's more recent formulation of it. These two scholars had many points in common, including: the importance attributed by both to the social factor, and to the theory of signs; the thesis of the inseparability of thought and semiosis; and the thesis of the connection between thought and action. Moreover, for both Peirce and Mead such aspects as finalism, chance, and creativity played an important role in the relation between mind and world. Morris identified a fundamental distinguishing element between the two scholars in his attribution of a metaphysical vision to Peirce and the altogether different "contextual or situational" approach characterizing Mead–a difference he traced back to Peirce's belief in "isomorphism between signs and things". We shall not dwell on this problem now, though it is doubtless worth observing that the current return to Peirce's philosophy, evident in Italy as well, would seem to contradict Morris' interpretation, at least in part. Here we shall simply observe that both Morris' acceptance of Mead's behaviorism and his recognition of the numerous points in common with Peirce's pragmatism is an indication that Morris' behaviorism is a special sort of behaviorism largely coincident with Peircean pragmaticism (more so than with the pragmatism of James, even though Morris did not fail to acknowledge his debt to the latter in a paper entitled "William James today", cf. Morris 1942).

In "Signs about signs about signs", Morris (1948) made a point of clarifying that he was mostly interested in behaviorism as it derived from Mead, as well as from Tolman and Hull. Indeed, far

from applying a theory of psychology as elaborated in the study of rats in the laboratory (as stated by one of Morris' critics) to human beings, Mead, Tolman, and Hull aimed at elaborating a general theory of behavior capable of explaining the behavior of both men and rats while at the same time accounting for the differences. The most interesting part of this 1948 paper by Morris is his reply to Bentley, who, in his review of SLB and with reference to Dewey's criticism of FTS, concentrated on the relation between Morris and Peirce. On considering Morris' use of the key concepts "interpreter" and "interpretant", Dewey accused the former of having "overturned Peirce". On his part and quoting from SLB, Morris replied that "as much as his orientation does not derive directly from Peirce", his position was in fact "an attempt at carrying out in resolute fashion his [Peirce's] approach to semiotics". On the other hand, Morris explains that his own form of behaviorism is a direct derivation from Mead, while only later was he to reckon with Peirce, as with Ogden and Richards, Carnap, Russell, and only subsequently with the behaviorists, Tolman and Hull. On replying to Bentley Morris also dealt with the criticism of Dewey, who was mainly concerned with the notions of "interpreter" and "interpretant" as adapted from Peirce. Dewey was unaware of the close connection established by Peirce between these two concepts, given that–at least in the text where he accused Morris of having misinterpreted Peirce–he viewed the relation between sign and interpretant as internal to the sign system, consequently leaving aside the relation between sign and interpretation and, therefore, the role of the interpreter in the process of semiosis in which something functions as a sign. There is no such thing as a sign without an interpretant or an interpreter, given that the interpretant is the effect of the sign on the interpreter; indeed, since the interpreter cannot exist as such if not as a modification caused by the sign in an open chain of interpretants, the interpreter is also an interpretant and therefore a sign. Peirce himself explained this coincidence between man and sign, interpreter and interpretant in "Some consequences of four incapacities" (*CP* 5. 264-317), while clarifying at the same time that far from eliminating any one of the two terms forming such pairs, each evidences a different aspect of the same process.

Another interesting point in Morris' discussion is his specification that Peirce used the term "interpretant" with different meanings: it is common knowledge that he in fact distinguished between immediate interpretant, dynamical interpretant, and final interpretant. Dewey's criticism of Morris was based on a misunderstanding which arose because of the different ways in which Peirce himself understood the term "interpretant", and despite Morris' own efforts at reducing the ambiguity of this term by introducing another, "significatum" ("designatum" in FTS) alongside it to indicate "the circumstances in which a person could respond because of a sign". Dewey used the term "interpretant" with the meaning of "significatum" as defined by Morris without realizing that for Morris, instead, the term "interpretant" indicated the effect of a sign on the interpreter. However, despite such misunderstanding and quoting from Dewey's *Logic*, in which he speaks of a preparatory disposition to act in a certain way toward the sign, Morris underlined how even Dewey in other contexts stressed this same aspect of the concept of sign.

It should now be clear that the sort of behaviorism supported by Morris was different from the mechanistic behaviorism of Watson, and from other approaches such as that of Bloomfield (who ousted the concept of meaning from the study of language) or Skinner, whose mechanistic conception as expressed in 1957 was heavily criticized by Chomsky (1959), among others.

In his 1964 book, *Signification and Significance: A Study of the Relation of Signs and Values*, Morris at last united the two main areas of his lifelong research: he had worked on values almost as much as he had worked on signs, and he rejected the idea that the mere fact of working on signs gave one the right to judge about values. A large part of his research had been dedicated especially to the problem of ethical and esthetic value judgments; in fact, after *Foundations of a Theory of Signs* and *Signs, Language and Behavior*, where such topics were already proposed within a

semiotic framework, and almost ten years before *Signification and Significance*, Morris had already focused specifically on the theory of value in his 1956 book, *Varieties of Human Value*.

In *Signification and Significance*, Morris analyzed the two senses in which the expression "to have meaning" may be understood: that is, as having value and of being significant on one hand, and of having a given linguistic meaning, a given signification on the other. The term "meaning" is doubled into "signification", the object of semiotics, and "significance", the object of axiology. In considering signs and values together, Morris faced the problem of identifying a direct link between semiotics (signification) and axiology (significance) insofar as the two are concerned with different aspects of the same process (human behavior), as well as the problem of rediscovering the semiotic consistency of the signifying process to which the very ambiguity of the term meaning testifies (cf. 1964a: vii).

In *Signification and Significance* Morris introduced terminological innovations relative to the identification of the components of semiosis. He listed five:

– *Sign* (or better, sign vehicle). This term refers to the object acting as a stimulus to sign behavior.

– *Interpreter.* This term indicates any organism acted on by the sign vehicle. Such an extension of the concept of interpreter to include any organism whatever, and therefore, any kind of sign behavior beyond the human, gave semiotics the possibility of not limiting itself exclusively to the social behavior of man, and therefore of reaching beyond the limits established by *semiologie* of Saussurean matrix. This kind of orientation in semiotic studies was to find original development in the research of one of Morris' direct successors, Thomas A. Sebeok.

–*Interpretant.* This term covers the disposition to respond to a certain type of object as the result of a sign stimulus.

–*Signification*. The object to which the interpreter responds through an interpretant–that is, the signified object which as such, specifies Morris, cannot function simultaneously as a stimulus. Signification here replaces what Morris had variously called *denotatum* (1938) and *significatum* (1946), while the concepts of interpreter and interpretant remain constant. That the object of signification cannot function as a stimulus does not mean, explains Morris, that what gives itself over to direct experience cannot be signified. The point is, rather, that only a part of such objects can be perceived directly; and it is this part that functions as the stimulus or sign vehicle. The part that is not fully perceived functions instead as the signified object, as the object of signification. When we say "this is a desk", we do so on the basis of our limited experience of the object in question, of that part that is perceived directly and interpreted as a sign of the fact that we are dealing with a desk on the basis of the hypothesis (with all the risks of possible error) that there exist parts we do not actually see; the back of the desk, its underside, the drawers, etc.

–Finally, *Context*. This term refers to the set of circumstances in which semiosis takes place.

Another important specification in this section on the identification of the fundamental components constituting semiosis concerns, albeit indirectly, the role of definition in the cognitive process. Morris explains that it was not his intention to give a definition of sign, but to establish the situations in which something may be recognized as a sign. Such an operational or pragmatic attitude toward the cognitive object serves to demystify the role generally assigned to definition. In fact, it is not a question of defining the object as the condition of its knowability, but of describing situations in which we deal with signs. Authors like Welby and Vailati, who criticize the excessive trust in the cognitive import of definition, had already worked in a similar direction.

In his effort to establish a link between the axiological dimension and the sign dimension of behavior, Morris began by describing signification as designative, prescriptive and appraisive, respectively exemplified with the terms "black", "ought" and "good". Following Mead, he then classified action as perceptual, manipulatory and consummatory. These three types of action and signification were then made to correspond reciprocally in the order indicated. Morris' research on the relation between signs and values is turned to identifying correspondences between notions established in the context of sign theory and notions established in the context of action analysis (Mead) and value theory. Such correspondences relate the two faces of the same process as though we were looking at the correspondences in writing on the two sides of the same sheet of paper. Morris' research concerns a fact of communication: communication among the order of signs and of values, and therefore, among the practitioners of fields concerned with such aspects of behavior.

Let us recall then Rossi-Landi's conclusion in its definitive formulation as expressed in his 1978 essay, "On some post-Morrisian problems": it states that Morris' behaviorism is best understood as a form of "social behavioristics" in which everything designated as "behavior" may be interpreted in terms of "social practice".

4. Rossi-Landi Interpreter of Morris

In Italy the only monograph on Charles Morris is that by Ferruccio Rossi-Landi in its two editions of 1953 and 1975; the latter reproduces the 1953 monograph without modifications, with the addition of a revised Italian version of "Signs about a master of sign". Therefore, the first part of the 1975 edition covers Morris up to 1946, and the second part, beyond observations concerning WGTS, returns to examining certain fundamental concepts in Morris' theory, as formulated in 1938 and 1946, in the light of more recent developments in twentieth century semiotics and of Rossi-Landi's own research. On the other hand, the novelty of this volume lies in the fact that it presents a complete bibliography of Morris' works, prepared by Rossi-Landi with the aim of offering a more comprehensive view of Morris' research itineraries.

Between these two editions of his monograph, Rossi-Landi published two major papers on Morris (in addition to the introduction to his translation of *Foundations*):

(a) His 1958 essay (written in 1956), "Universo di discorso e lingua ideale in filosofia" is dedicated to a confrontation between Gustav Bergmann and Morris. This paper continued to focus on Morris' two books of 1938 and 1946, though his new research was also mentioned–on the basis of information Rossi-Landi received from Morris through their correspondence (cf. Petrilli 19??)–with the expectation of new and original developments. Furthermore, Rossi-Landi announced the imminent publication of the long-awaited and important *Varieties of Human Value* (1956), the result of the "new empirical research on values, on which Morris has been working for more than a decade".

(b) His "Presentazione" of Morris' writings on esthetics, which he had translated into Italian for *Nuova corrente* in 1967; this piece was subsequently republished in 1972 in *Semiotica e ideologia* under the title "Sul modo in cui e stata fraintesa la semiotica estetica di Charles Morris". Here we simply wish to observe that in this paper Rossi Landi once again stresses the importance in Morris of value theory, reminding us of its presence in his work as far back as his 1939 essay on esthetic semiotics. At the time Morris had distinguished between three primary types of discourse: scientific, esthetic, and technological. According to Morris, any discourse proposing valuations was classifiable as technological discourse; consequently, insofar as it involved value judgments,

esthetic criticism required not only a theory of signs (sufficient for esthetic analysis) but also a theory of values.

Finally, concerning Rossi-Landi's updated interpretation of Morris with respect to his 1953 monograph, we must return to his most recent essay on Morris, "On some post-Morrisian problems" first published in English in 1978, followed by German and Italian editions in 1981 and 1988, respectively. Though interesting from the viewpoint of the relation between Morris and Rossi-Landi, this essay is substantially a reworking of the English and Italian versions of Rossi-Landi's 1975 paper "Signs about a master of signs" in which Morris' concept of behavior is developed in relation to Rossi-Landi's own concepts of social reproduction and communication. Rossi-Landi underlines the importance of value theory in semiotics in this paper as well, both in Morrisian semiotics (given that Morris "dealt with values at least as much as he dealt with signs") and in semiotics at large as it was emerging in those years. In the section entitled "Signs and values", after recalling Morris' 1939 essay and his "Science, art and technology", published in that same year, and after mentioning his books *Paths of Life* (1942), *The Open Self* (1948), *Varieties of Human Value* (1956), and *Signification and Significance* (1964), Rossi-Landi makes the following observation:

Morris was thus placing values beside signs and opposing the idea that the mere study of signs could give any right to judge about values. Present-day discussions on the limits of structuralism, on the differences between analysis and evaluation, and on the relations between systems of signs and systems of values or ideologies tend to indicate that no semiotic system, and the more so no text, can be completely understood and properly assessed unless the values it necessarily springs from, and conveys, are also taken into account. (1978: 9)

In his 1953 monograph on Morris, Rossi-Landi criticized the behavioral framework of SLB, which made of Morris' semiotics not only a theory of signs but also a biological science as distinct from philosophy. Rossi-Landi maintained that the reduction of semiosis to behavior, and therefore of semiotics to the study of sign behavior–where behavior is limited, in accordance with the dominant American tradition, to observable behavior–was already implicit in FTS.

In Rossi-Landi's view such a biological ring constituted the very limit of Morris' semiotics. He summed up his criticism in three propositions: (1) the science of behavior is founded on observation; (2) the condition of being a sign cannot be studied as the property of a thing that has become a sign; (3) there is no single criterion permitting a univocal distinction between nonsign behavior and sign behavior. Proposition (2) is further elaborated with another three propositions: (a) the property of being a sign can be attributed to anything whatsoever; (b) it is a property of investiture; (c) it is a property that comes in pairs. All this clarifies that a sign cannot be explained observationally. Rossi-Landi followed up the three main points of his criticism with another three specifications: (4) this does not mean accept ing the mentalistic alternative; (5) it still remains to be seen whether a technique of sign activity is possible insofar as it is non-observational; (6) within certain limits it is possible to develop a sort of natural history of sign behavior on an observational basis. Expressed in more discursive terms, Rossi-Landi's criticism consisted in underlining the fact that the property of being a sign may be applied to physical objects and their representations as much as to such things as memories or sentiments: anything may become a sign. For sign property to be obtained a relation must be established between a thing and a significatum; but on his part Morris lost sight of this relation when he articulated sign behavior into response sequences. Rossi-Landi much preferred FTS to SLB from this viewpoint as well: in fact, in FTS Morris spoke of signs as "properties of things in their function of serving as signs" (Morris 1938c: 4), thereby recognizing that nothing is intrinsically a sign and that semiotics may study anything that participates in the process of semiosis. In his introduction to the Italian translation of FTS, Rossi-Landi (see 1954d) substantially repeated his critical assessments as they had been formulated in his 1953 monograph.

A step forward in Rossi-Landi's research on Morris is represented by his 1958 essay "Universo del discorso e lingue ideale in filosofia". Here Rossi-Landi's discussion of Morris' thought system and confrontation with Gustav Bergmann opens the way to questions that were to find a thorough theoretical treatment in Rossi-Landi's 1961 volume, *Significato, comunicazione e parlare comune*. In fact, the problem of the relation between behaviorism and sign theory is treated with reference to the question of the relation between "common speaking" and the "historical flux of language" on one hand, and to the historical languages and ideal or technical languages on the other. Morris' semiotics in 1946 proposed a technical language, and as such it was considered to be distinct from philosophy. On his part, instead, Gustav Bergmann had developed a philosophical conception of language which recalled certain aspects, subsequently abandoned, of Morris 1938. The limits of Morris' biologism largely stemmed from his "excessive trust" in the possibility of constructing a technical language. Though Rossi-Landi was substantially in agreement with Morris concerning the non-philosophical character of semiotics, to Morris he juxtaposed the more cautious approach of Bergmann, who posed as a problem–a philosophical problem also–the relation between "common speech" and ideal language. In short, in this essay of 1958 Rossi-Landi attempted an interpretation of the two principal phases of Morrisian semiotics in terms of "special", or "technical" or "ideal" languages specifically constructed to talk about signs, as well as in terms of the universe of discourse to which such special languages belong.

In his "Premessa" to the Italian translation of Morris' three pieces (see Morris 1967a) published in *Nuova corrente*, Rossi-Landi took a stand against the widespread equivocation concerning Morris' esthetic semiotics, specifying the following: (1) To speak of "semiotic esthetics" (and worse still given its even more reductive nature, of semantic esthetics) is a distortion. Rather, we should speak of "esthetic semiotics", or of a sign theory that is applicable to esthetics as well. (2) As anticipated above, esthetic criticism deals with both signs and values, and must therefore involve the two fields theorized by Morris, semiotics and axiology. (3) Finally, Morris' tripartite division of semiosis into syntax, semantics, and pragmatics should not be considered as a real distinction: on the contrary, it is the result of abstraction and is functional only for analysis. Bearing in mind that certain theoretical trends still maintain the ontological character of this distinction, the latter is the most important specification today.

In his 1975 essay, "Signs about a master of signs", Rossi-Landi discussed the historical-philosophical matrix of the three dimensions of semiotics theorized by Morris. In fact, if we consider the genesis of Morrisian semiotics, says Rossi-Landi, going back at least to Morris' booklet of 1937, *Logical Positivism, Pragmatism, and Scientific Empiricism*, it is immediately clear that Morris was projecting the unification of methodological rationalism, radical empiricism, and critical pragmatism–three components that correspond to the three dimensions of semiotics: methodological rationalism is a syntactic inquiry; radical empiricism a semantic inquiry; critical pragmatism a pragmatic inquiry. Rossi-Landi adds:

All this may be surprising to anyone coming to semiotics without a taste of philosophico-historical culture, and accepting the tripartition of semiotics as a mere result of objective investigation carried out on signs. Instead, such "objective" investigation would not have been possible without the described confluence of different currents of thought. Objectivity is always a complex result, even if afterwards it may present itself to us as simple. (1975b: 161)

In this same essay, Rossi-Landi returned to the problem of the relation between sign and behavior, and did so within a sort of self-critical theoretical framework. Having said, in 1953, that it was not possible to distinguish between sign behavior and nonsign behavior on the basis of bio-psychological behavioristics, Rossi-Landi realized that so expressed the implication then was that such a distinction was in any case possible. Instead, in 1975, he clearly asserted the impossibility of distinguishing *tout cours* between sign behavior and nonsign behavior–the fundamental reason being that we cannot have behavior without communication. Furthermore, in this paper, Rossi-

Landi repeated his conviction that Morris' *Foundations* deserved consideration more than his *Signs, Language and Behavior*, and that the foundations of semiotics, especially as an eminently social science, could possibly be located in behavioristic psycho-biology.

Rossi-Landi often returned to Morris, developing his thought system in relation to his own theoretical works. Indeed, as stated by the same Rossi-Landi (1988), his interests and studies with respect to such authors, beyond Morris, as Ryle, Wittgenstein, and Vailati have always been of a theoretical order, while his books and papers have always dealt with specific problems. Rossi-Landi's references to Morris recur in his 1961 book, *Significato, comunicazione e parlare comune*. He returned in particular to certain problems that had already been treated in his 1958 essay, and precisely to the concept of "universe of discourse", reporting a personal communication–the exchange of letters of December 27, 1955 and January 10, 1956 (cf. Petrilli 1992c)–in which Morris specified the three significations according to which the notion of universe of discourse might find application: (1) Delimitation of an area of the Universe which is to be talked about; (2) delimitation of the language to be used; (3) a combination of the above two (cf. Rossi-Landi 1998: 65).

Rossi-Landi developed this problem still further in 1961 with his proposal to push ahead with respect to what Morris himself had succeeded in grasping of the signifying process (1998: 193), while at the same time taking up two fundamental points from the master: (1) that meanings are not entities detached from the real processes of communication and interpretation (1998: 177); and (2) that the three dimensions of the signifying process or of semiosis identified by Morris are inseparable.

After complete silence on Morris in his book of 1968 *Language as Work and Trade*, Rossi-Landi continued working on him in his 1972 collection of essays *Semiotica e ideologia*, in which he uses Morris as a major reference point for the development of his own sign model as well as in determining the boundaries of the semiotic field generally. Morris' contribution was invaluable to Rossi-Landi for the distinction between semiotics and its reductive identification with semantics, as well as in supporting his material and dialectical interpretation of the Peircean sign model, which in the words of Rossi-Landi "is taken up and proficuously simplified by Charles Morris" (1994: 305). In *Semiotica e ideologia*, Rossi-Landi (1994: 116) also referred to Morris' master, George H. Mead, with the intention of granting him the merit of having already studied merchandise in communicative terms in his early 1934 book, *Mind, Self, and Society* (edited by Morris in a new edition of 1965). In addition, Rossi-Landi (1994: 197) also granted Mead the further merit of having understood that mind must be explained in terms of signs rather than explaining signs in terms of mind ontologically intended.

The republication of his 1953 monograph in a new edition of 1975 testifies to the renewal of Rossi-Landi's interest in Morris, whose name also reappeared in his more recent papers as collected in his book of 1985, *Metodica filosofica e scienza dei segni*. In this volume, Rossi Landi brings our attention to Morris in relation to the concepts of *interpretant* and *denotatum* . His ongoing dialogue with the "master of signs" never fails to be both critical and constructive, as when, for example, Rossi-Landi (1985a: 152) introduces the terms *signans* and *signatum* to talk about signs, observing that Morris, like Saussure, had fallen prey to a misunderstanding concerning the relation between signans and signs, he had confused a part of the totality with the totality itself.

In Rossi-Landi the study of signs was to be more and more characterized as the study of social reproduction, with respect to which the concept of social practice is fundamental. Here we shall limit ourselves to underlining that though the notion of social reproduction was originally derived from Hegel and Marx, behaviorism as intended by both Mead and Morris was also to play an

important role in Rossi-Landi's theories, if only because the notion of "social practice" has, as clearly stated by Rossi-Landi himself (1978), a certain Morrisian flavor.

In the words of Rossi-Landi (in Morris 1938, It. trans.: xix): "After his Foundations, Morris' research developed in two different directions. One consists in elaborating the notion of sign and a general sign theory [...]the other deals with the problem of value" (trans. from Italian by S.P.).

Rossi-Landi continued his "dialogue" with Morris in his 1978 essay, "On some post-Morrisian problems", which, as mentioned, for the most part repeats his viewpoint as expressed in "Signs about a master of signs". However, in 1978 he proposed a particularly important novelty which deserves special attention: his reinterpretation of Morris' behaviorism in terms of "social practice", a concept on which Rossi-Landi worked throughout his lifelong research.